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1. Introduction 
Is Chinese outward foreign direct investment (FDI) primarily drawn to poorly governed countries 
with abundant natural resources? In recent years, the Chinese financial presence globally has 
increased substantially, in terms of loans provided, investments made, and other types of flows. In 
particular, there has been a marked rise in outward Chinese foreign direct investment in recent 
years. This has spurred discussion and analyses of the motivation and implications of an increased 
Chinese presence, not least in developing economies. On the one hand, increased Chinese 
investment may be good for host countries, since more companies vie for locations and markets, 
and potentially expand opportunities for transfer of technology. On the other hand, however, 
concerns have been voiced that Chinese investment or financial flows more generally have 
contributed to propping up bad regimes in host countries, and been conducted with a view to 
exploiting their natural resources. To borrow a headline from The Economist, is China simply “a 
ravenous dragon” or is there more to Chinese investment than this?1 
 
Though Chinese outward FDI has generated considerable interest, concern and controversy, few 
empirical studies have been conducted to test the motives behind or consequences of the presence of 
Chinese multinationals in other countries. There is by now a large econometric literature on the host 
country determinants of FDI in general, which, if anything, suggests that FDI is attracted to 
countries with good institutions (Globerman and Shapiro, 2002). Since FDI in general is dominated 
by flows from developed countries, it is an open question whether these results generalize to 
Chinese outward FDI. Moreover, there is an emerging literature on FDI flows from emerging 
economies, which suggests that these flows may differ from those of developed economies 
(Filatotchev et al, 2007). Most studies of FDI related to China, have focused on China as a location 
for FDI from other countries, rather than as a source of FDI. To date there are only three 
econometric studies of the determinants of Chinese outward FDI that we are aware of, which 
present mixed results. Buckley et al (2007) find that Chinese FDI is attracted to countries with bad 
institutions (high political risk), whereas Cheung and Qian (2008) find no significant effect of 
institutions. The latter study finds Chinese FDI to be attracted by natural resources, the former gets 
this result only for later time periods. A third study by Cheng and Ma (2008) does not include 
institutions nor resources as explanatory variables.  
 
This paper presents new econometric results on the host country determinants of Chinese outward 
FDI, which significantly improve on previous studies. A main problem with the studies of Buckley 
et al (2007) and Cheung and Qian (2008) is that their data on FDI captures approved investment, 
rather than actual investment.2 The results are therefore potentially biased, as investment that is 
publicly approved may be of a character different from investment decisions that are less visible. 
For instance, non-approved flows may reflect private investment decisions based on different 
objectives than government approved flows, or public investment decisions reflecting motives a 
government may be reluctant to reveal, such as a drive for natural resources, or the exploitation of 
host countries with poor institutions. This paper uses more recent data on actual Chinese FDI flows, 
and therefore provides more reliable results on the impact of host country institutions and resources 
on Chinese investment. Moreover, previous studies have looked at institutions and natural resources 
in isolation, and not explored whether the two have a joint influence on Chinese FDI. By contrast, 
this study tests and finds of significant importance an interacted effect of institutions and resources, 
                                                     
1 The Economist, March 15th 2008, Special report p. 3. 
2 Approved investment numbers also did not include reinvested earnings, leading to serious underestimates of Chinese 
FDI (Cheng and Ma, 2008). Cai (1999) suggests that only 15-20% of actual financial outflows in the period up to the late 
1990s were approved. 
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suggesting that Chinese investment is more attracted to a country with natural resources, the worse 
the institutional environment of that country. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a descriptive overview of Chinese FDI flows, 
and relates this to the existing empirical literature on the topic. Since there are suggestions that 
Chinese FDI reflects different motives than  FDI generally, section 3 reviews theoretical arguments 
as to why this may be the case, leading to a set of testable hypotheses relating to the impact of 
natural resources and institutions. Section 4 then presents the empirical strategy and the data of the 
paper. Results on the impact of institutions and natural resources on Chinese FDI are presented and 
discussed in section 5, which also contains a number of robustness tests. Section 6 concludes. 
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2. Chinese outward FDI: Patterns and evidence  
2.1 Descriptive overview of Chinese outward FDI 
Outward foreign direct investment from China has increased considerably in recent years, and 
China is the source of FDI in a great number of host economies. While the open door policy in the 
late 1970s lead to modest outward FDI, the liberalization associated with Deng Xiaping’s tour of 
South China in 1992, and the Go Global strategy initiated in 1999, lead to boosts in Chinese 
outward FDI, and outward FDI in recent years has increased substantially (Cai, 1999; Hong and 
Sun, 2006; Cheng and Ma, 2008, Buckley et al, 2007). While China accounted for 3.3% of total 
outward investments from developing countries in 1996, its share had risen to 10% in 2006. This 
makes China the 3rd largest developing country in terms of outward FDI (after Hong Kong and 
Brazil), up from 7th position in 1996. In global terms, however, China was only the 17th largest 
country in terms of outward FDI flows in 2006, and small in comparison to the major industrialized 
economies.3 
 
China started publishing outward FDI data consistent with OECD and IMF standards only in 2003 
(Cheung and Qian, 2008). According to the data from Unctad used in this study, 142 countries 
received investment from China in the period 2003-2006. Table 1 presents the 15 largest host 
economies for Chinese FDI, as well as the total flows for the four years for which comprehensive 
data is available. As the bottom row of the table shows, total FDI from China has increased more 
than six times in current terms in the period 2003-2006. The far right column shows that the bulk of 
the investment, more than 80%, goes to offshore financial centres such as the Cayman Islands and 
the British Virgin Islands, and to Hong Kong. However, a number of other countries receive 
substantial amounts in absolute terms, this includes both OECD and non-OECD countries. 
 
 
Table 1. Largest 15 host countries of Chinese outward FDI, 2003-2006 flows, current USD mill. and 
shares 
2003 2004 2005 2006 Total 2003-2006 Share 2003-2006
Cayman Islands 806.61 1286.13 5162.75 7832.72 15088.21 0.39
Hong Kong, China 1148.98 2628.39 3419.7 6930.96 14128.03 0.37
British Virgin Islands 209.68 385.52 1226.08 538.11 2359.39 0.06
Korea, Republic of 153.92 40.23 588.82 27.32 810.29 0.02
Russian Federation 30.62 77.31 203.33 452.11 763.37 0.02
United States 65.05 119.93 231.82 198.34 615.14 0.02
Australia 30.39 124.95 193.07 87.6 436.01 0.01
Sudan 146.7 91.13 50.79 288.62 0.01
Germany 25.06 27.5 128.74 76.72 258.02 0.01
Algeria 2.47 11.21 84.87 98.93 197.48 0.01
Singapore -3.21 47.98 20.33 132.15 197.25 0.01
Nigeria 24.4 45.52 53.3 67.79 191.01 0.00
Mongolia 4.43 40.16 52.34 82.39 179.32 0.00
Indonesia 26.8 61.96 11.84 56.94 157.54 0.00
Kazakhstan 2.94 2.31 94.93 46 146.18 0.00
Total (all countries) 2854.64 5498.01 12261.17 17633.97 38247.79 1.00  
 
From a cursory inspection of the largest recipient countries, countries that are tax havens, 
geographically close to China, that are endowed with natural resources in the form of petroleum, or 
that represent large markets, appear to attract Chinese investment. A number of the largest host 
                                                     
3 See http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_dir/docs/wir2008_outflows_en.xls.  
CMI WORKING PAPER WHAT DETERMINES CHINESE OUTWARD FDI? WP 2009: 3 
 
 4 
countries to Chinese FDI also have poor institutional records, Sudan for instance is among the 7-8 
least democratic and most corrupt countries in the world, according to 2008 Freedom House and 
Transparency International indices.4 Table 2 breaks Chinese FDI into host regions, where the 
dominant flows are to Latin American and the Caribbean, and to Asia, again reflecting tax haven 
status or geographical vicinity. Interestingly, though receiving a small share of the total, Africa is 
host to more Chinese FDI than Europe, North America or Oceania. 
 
 
Table 2. Regional shares of Chinese outward FDI flows, 2003-20065 
2003 2004 2005 2006
Total 2003-
2006
Africa 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.03
Asia 0.53 0.55 0.37 0.44 0.44
Europe 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Latin America and 
the Carribean 0.36 0.32 0.53 0.48 0.46
North America 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02
Oceania 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01  
 
 
As for sectoral composition, just over 40% of Chinese outward FDI flows in 2006 were in the 
mining and petroleum sector, whereas almost 54% was in various service industries (mainly 
business services and finance), and only 4% in manufacturing (Cheng and Ma, 2008). Though these 
proportions fluctuate from year to year, this again would seem to suggest that accessing large 
markets and natural resources are important aspects of Chinese outward FDI. It is likely that service 
industry investments gravitate more to developed countries, and resource investment to developing 
countries, however, currently available data do not permit cross-classification by industry and 
country, making it difficult to be more precise about sector distribution in individual regions or 
countries. However, we return to the question of distinctions in determinants between developed 
and developing countries in our analysis below. 
 
While the above descriptive overview of Chinese outward FDI flows is suggestive in terms of host 
country determinants, more systematic analysis is needed to establish the importance of resources, 
institutions, markets and other factors for FDI flows. To this end, we perform an econometric 
analysis of Chinese outward FDI. In doing so, the rather curious pattern of heavy FDI flows to tax 
havens represents a challenge. Several studies suggest that the investment of China in Hong Kong 
and tax havens reflect a phenomenon of “round-tripping”, whereby funds are moved abroad to take 
advantage of beneficial host country conditions, and then re-invested in China to benefit from 
advantageous terms for foreign investors (Morck et al., 2008;Yeung and Lie, 2008; Cheng and Ma, 
2008; Cheng and Stough, 2007). Alternatively, these flows may represent the establishment of 
holding companies for investment elsewhere, or attempts to conceal wealth from tax authorities or 
other parties (Morck et al., 2008). Due to the inherent secrecy of these locations, the nature and 
ultimate destinations of FDI flows are difficult to reveal (Morck et al., 2008; Cheng and Ma, 2008). 
For this reason, since these flows likely reflect motives different from other FDI flows, and since 
data on key explanatory variables is not available for these locations, we exclude them in the 
subsequent analysis. 
 
                                                     
4http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=410&year=2008 and  
http://www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2008/cpi2008/cpi_2008_table.  
5 Country classifications according to United Nations Statistics Division. 
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2.2 Evidence on Chinese outward FDI  
Some systematic empirical evidence on host country determinants of Chinese FDI does exist. Given 
the increasing financial presence of China abroad, a number of studies have been published in 
recent years on Chinese FDI. Most of these present simple descriptive data on Chinese investment 
and/or theoretical arguments, some of which we will return to in the following section. As noted, 
however, three econometric studies have to date been performed on data on Chinese FDI flows. 
While these studies suggest a number of relevant variables to include in our analysis, their results 
are mixed, and they also have flaws in the data used and their specifications, which need to be 
addressed. 
 
Buckley et al (2007) use panel data on approved Chinese FDI to 49 countries, for the period 1984-
2001. They find that more Chinese investment goes to countries with poor institutions (proxied by 
an index of political risk), whereas natural resources (measured as the share of ores and metals 
exports in total merchandise exports) are insignificant in the full sample. Splitting the sample into 
two sub-periods, their results show that institutions are significant only in the period 1992-2001, 
and that natural resources significantly attract Chinese FDI in this period. This suggests that these 
variables have become more important in more recent years, following the liberalization associated 
with Deng Xiaoping’s South China Tour in 1992. For other variables, Buckley et al. find that 
Chinese FDI is attracted to countries with large GDP, high inflation, high exports and imports, and 
cultural proximity to China, while patents, exchange rates, distance from China and total FDI as a 
share of GDP, were found to be insignificant. 
 
Cheung and Qian (2008) similarly perform a fixed effect estimation, on data on approved Chinese 
FDI flows to 31 countries over the period 1991-2005. In their base specification, they find that 
institutions (measured as country risk) are insignificant, while natural resources (proxied as the ratio 
of fuels, ores and metals exports in total merchandise exports) significantly attract Chinese FDI. For 
other variables, they find that Chinese FDI is attracted by host country GDP and deterred by GDP 
per capita, but as both these are measured relative to Chinese GDP, this makes interpretation 
difficult. Moreover, low wages attract Chinese FDI. Cheung and Qian also rerun their estimation on 
data on actual Chinese FDI for the years 2003-2005, getting few significant results, which is not 
surprising given the lack of temporal variation. 
 
Finally, Cheng and Ma (2008) conduct an analysis on actual Chinese FDI data for 90 host countries 
over the period 2003-2006. Though panel data estimation is used, the exact method is not revealed 
in their paper. Their specification does not include institutions nor natural resources. For other 
variables, they find that GDP and cultural proximity to and a common border with China attract 
Chinese FDI, whereas distance from China and landlocked countries deter Chinese FDI. 
 
In sum, previous empirical studies do not provide a clear picture of host country determinants of 
Chinese FDI. Their results suggest that poor institutions either attract or do not matter for FDI from 
China, and that natural resources either attract Chinese FDI or do not matter. As noted earlier, the 
two studies that include institutions and natural resources as explanatory variables use data on 
approved rather than actual FDI flows, which may produce biased results. The only study which 
uses data on actual FDI flows, does not include institutions nor natural resources among its 
explanatory variables. Our analysis addresses this lacuna by testing the impact of institutions and 
natural resources on actual Chinese FDI flows. There are also good theoretical arguments for adding 
the interaction of institutions and natural resources to the empirical specification, as discussed in the 
following section. 
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3. Is China different? Theoretical arguments. 
The above studies suggest that Chinese investors may respond differently to host country factors 
than other investors, at least with respect to institutions. Theoretical studies argue that good host 
country institutions will reduce risk and costs of doing business and increase productivity 
(Blonigen, 2005), and hence attract FDI. Most recent empirical studies of total FDI flows also 
document a positive relationship to host country institutions (Asiedu, 2006; Harms and Ursprung, 
2002; Wei, 2000; Globerman and Shapiro, 2002; Gani, 2007). While Bénassy-Quéré et al (2007) 
argues that these studies do not control for endogeneity, we are not aware of any study suggesting 
that weak institutions increase total FDI inflows. While natural resources are one locational 
advantage in the OLI framework of Dunning (1977, 1993), their impact on total FDI has not been 
much examined empirically. Harms and Ursprung (2002) get mixed results for an oil dummy, and 
Asiedu (2006) finds resources significant for total FDI flows to African countries. 
 
So is China different, and if so why? A number of different mechanisms may explain why Chinese 
investment may be particularly attracted to countries with natural resources, or a poor institutional 
environment. This section provides a theoretical analysis of possible reasons for this potential 
difference, leading to a set of testable hypotheses, which to some extent also permits distinction 
between different theoretical explanations of Chinese FDI patterns. From a theoretical perspective, 
two background characteristics of the Chinese economy can be distinguished which have 
implications for the relation of Chinese outward FDI to host country institutions, natural resources, 
and their interaction. 
 
Firstly, the Chinese companies that invest abroad are predominantly state-owned. In 2006, 82% of 
China’s non-financial outward FDI was conducted by state-owned enterprises (Yeung and Liu, 
2008). Of the thirty largest companies by outward FDI, all but two are state controlled, and though 
most are listed on a stock exchange, the state retains majority power and appoints executives, 
largely from party ranks (Morck et al, 2008). This means that their investment decisions reflect 
political objectives, and not just profit-maximization as in the case of privately owned 
multinationals from other countries.6 In principle, such objectives may be to promote domestic 
development (Deng, 2004), ensure regime survival or increase the wealth or status of those in power 
(Morck et al, 2008), to support Chinese foreign policy, or promote host country development 
(Yeung and Liu, 2008). The latter objective would entail more Chinese FDI to poorer countries, 
which our empirical analysis does not confirm, and is hence unlikely to be of importance. Though 
some studies claim that Chinese FDI is becoming more commercial (Cheng and Stough, 2008; 
Hong and Sun, 2006), political objectives likely remain relatively more important than for 
multinationals from other countries. Even FDI by privately owned Chinese firms may to some 
extent reflect political objectives, due to the incentives they face when investing abroad (cf. Cheng 
and Ma, 2008). 
 
Secondly, in addition to reflecting different objectives, Chinese FDI may also reflect different 
opportunities or incentives than FDI from other countries. In particular, China has a quite different 
institutional environment than the major source countries of FDI from the developed world. The 
level of corruption in China is much higher than in the major industrialized source countries of FDI. 
Moreover, for those companies listed, China has much weaker stock market regulations than other 
countries, and only 15% of Chinese overseas listing is in the United States (Hung et al., 2008). A 
number of studies argue that home country institutions affect their competitive advantages (Belloc, 
2006; Levchenko, 2007, Costinot, 2009). In terms of FDI, some studies suggest that investment 
                                                     
6 This also means that Dunning’s eclectic paradigm, which is “the dominant paradigm explaining the extent 
and pattern of the foreign value added activities” i.e. profit maximizing activities (Dunning, 2000:163), may 
not be directly applicable to the Chinese case, hence it is not used to structure the discussion here. 
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patterns do not just reflect better or worse institutions, but also similarities in institutions between 
home and host country. For instance, Habib and Zurawicki (2002) find that greater absolute 
differences in corruption have a negative impact on bilateral FDI. The institutional setting in China 
may thus be an important determinant of the sectors and countries it invests in. 
 
Accordingly, a number of studies of Chinese FDI suggest that Chinese companies have competitive 
advantages in countries with weak institutions. In contrast to companies from developed economies, 
Chinese companies are experienced in “navigating complex patron-client relationships and personal 
and institutional favours in relatively opaque and difficult business environments” and in “dealing 
with burdensome regulations and navigating around ..  opaque political constraints” (Yeung and 
Liu, 2008:71; Morck et al 2008:346). In this respect, Chinese firms face a lesser “liability of 
foreignness” than its Western counterparts (He and Lyles, 2008; Child and Rodrigues, 2005). 
Moreover, less stringent regulation of Chinese firms makes ethically questionable activities such as 
corruption less risky and financially costly, and perhaps also less costly morally in a country where 
such activities are more common. In addition, extensive personal or ethnic networks  may serve as a 
substitute for formal institutions (cf. Tong, 2005; Shafer 2007; Park and Luo 2001; Kiong and Kee, 
1998). All these arguments converge on a hypothesis that Chinese FDI may be attracted to 
(specialize in) countries with poor institutions. 
 
The fact that Chinese multinationals are predominantly state-owned, whose activities reflect 
political objectives, augments and adds nuance to this hypothesis. Several studies argue that the 
organization of these companies, the focus on political expediency of investments, and the 
economic and political backing of the government, have lead to excessive risk taking and 
unprofitable investments (Yeung and Liu, 2008; Morck et al., 2008; Buckley et al., 2007). As one 
main effect of institutions is to reduce risk (Blonigen, 2005), this again suggests that Chinese 
investment may be attracted to countries with poor institutions. This leads to the first hypothesis to 
be tested in our empirical analysis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Chinese FDI is attracted by countries with poor institutions 
 
The variety of political objectives that Chinese FDI may reflect do, however, also entail the need to 
make some important distinctions between different types of host country institutions. The previous 
arguments all suggest that Chinese FDI may flows to countries with weak private sector institutions, 
i.e. institutions governing the profitability of productive enterprise, such as the rule of law. It has, 
however, been suggested that that China may direct FDI to undemocratic countries for ideological 
or strategic reasons (Buckley et al., 2007). This would suggest that a different type of institutions 
attracts Chinese FDI, namely institutions of public accountability, or democracy.7 While state 
ownership and the institutional setting in China predict a negative relationship between Chinese FDI 
and the quality of host country institutions, different theoretical premises thus lead to two different 
sub-hypotheses on which institutions matter. Since existing studies of Chinese FDI have used 
composite institutional proxies, they do not really address these questions. In our empirical analysis, 
we use disaggregate institutional indices to test whether private sector institutions or democracy in 
host countries affect Chinese FDI. 
 
As for natural resources, a number of studies suggest that China invests in resource rich countries to 
obtain greater security of access to energy and other resources (Cheng and Ma, 2008; Morck et al. 
2008; Hong and Sun, 2006; Deng, 2004). Frynas and Paolo (2007) see this as a primary motive for 
China’s involvement in Africa. Energy security is seen as necessary to maintain a high rate of 
                                                     
7 See Kolstad (2009) for a discussion of the distinction between private sector institutions and institutions of 
public accountability. 
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economic development, upon which the future of the government also likely depends. In fact, given 
experiences of unrest in other countries due to shortages or rising prices of energy, this may be 
viewed as particularly important to maintain control politically. Given the geopolitical importance 
of oil, controlling energy resources may also be of strategic importance. In principle, it could be that 
Chinese investment in natural resources could reflect competitive advantages in this sector, and 
Cheng and Ma (2008) presents some arguments to this effect, but this is deemed unlikely by Frynas 
and Paolo (2007). If Chinese investment is directed to natural resource rich countries, this most 
likely reflects political objectives. To find out whether this is actually the case, we test the following 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Chinese FDI is attracted by countries with large natural resources 
 
Testing this hypothesis also allows us to address the contrary claim of Globerman and Shapiro 
(2009) that securing resources is a relatively unimportant motive for Chinese FDI. As noted earlier, 
previous studies of Chinese FDI arrive at different results for the importance of natural resources, 
using different proxies for this variable. We therefore also distinguish between different types of 
resources, notably fuels and ores and metals. 
 
An empirical specification reflecting the above two hypotheses, would test only for direct or 
unconditional effects of institutions and natural resources on FDI, respectively. In other words, do 
poor institutions generally attract Chinese FDI, and do natural resources generally attract Chinese 
FDI? There is good reason, however, to believe that the effect of these two explanatory variables on 
FDI may be linked, that the impact of institutions on FDI depends on the level of resources, and 
vice versa. A number of studies on natural resources and development point out that certain of these 
resources present large and appropriable rents, which lead to problems of corruption, rent-seeking 
and patronage in resource rich countries with poor institutions (Leite and Weidmann, 1999; 
Mehlum et al., 2006; Robinson et al., 2006; Kolstad and Wiig, forthcoming). A study of oil 
companies in Angola  also argues that while institutions may reduce risk, costs and increase 
productivity, institutions also have an impact on the distribution of rents, potentially shifting rents 
from host country governments and multinational corporations to host country populations (Wiig 
and Kolstad, 2009). 
 
Given the large and appropriable rents in natural resource rich countries, it is reasonable to argue 
that the returns to any competitive advantage China has in operating in countries with poor 
institutions, are greater where these kinds of resources are present. Or to be blunt,  companies with a 
competitive advantage in bribery, are likely to invest more in countries where the payoffs from 
bribes are greater, which is arguably the case in resource rich countries. Distributive effects of 
institutions are more likely to outweigh risk and cost effects in resource rich countries, producing 
greater gains to those investors able and willing to manoeuvre a challenging institutional settings. 
These arguments relate to both commercial and political returns, if secure access to natural 
resources is important politically, this can be achieved more efficiently in countries where Chinese 
companies have a competitive advantage. 
 
In sum, this means that one would expect institutions to have more of a negative effect on Chinese 
FDI, the more natural resources a host country has. Or conversely, natural resources attract Chinese 
FDI more, the worse the institutions of a host country. This can be tested by including an interaction 
effect between institutions and natural resources, which would be negative if the above arguments 
hold. Thus, our third hypothesis is: 
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Hypothesis 3: Chinese FDI is negatively related to the interaction of natural resources and 
institutions. 
 
Our empirical specification will thus include variables that simultaneously test the effect of 
institutions and resources, and their interaction. If support is found for hypothesis 3, one way to 
interpret this is that Chinese investment abroad is made to exploit countries with large natural 
resources and poor institutions, confer the above discussion on the distribution of resource rents. 
Other interpretations are also possible, for instance that for China as a latecomer in FDI, the only 
opportunities for investment in natural resources are in poorly governed countries, and we attempt 
to empirically distinguish these two interpretations. 
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4. Data and methodology 
Consistent with the theory and hypotheses formulated above, our empirical specification includes 
institutions and natural resources as well as their interaction as explanatory variables. More 
precisely, the main estimated equation is: 
 
iii3
i2i1i
)resources Natural*ons(Instituti
resources NaturalnsInstitutioFDI outward Chinese
εβ
ββα
+++
++=
iControlsγ
   (1) 
 
Table 3 presents the proxies used for the main variables, and the sources of data. Our dependent 
variable is Chinese outward FDI flows, for which UNCTAD has data for the years 2003-2006 for 
142 host countries. As noted, this data captures Chinese FDI more comprehensively than earlier 
data used in previous studies such as Buckley et al (2007) and Cheung and Qian (2008), which only 
captured approved flows. The data for our dependent variable is in millions of constant 2000 USD. 
 
 
Table 3. Main variables 
Variable Explanation Source
Chinese outward FDI Annual inflow of Chinese FDI UNCTAD
GDP Host country GDP World Bank World Development Indicators 2008
Trade Total import and exports as share of GDP
World Bank World Development 
Indicators 2008
Inflation Inflation rate World Bank World Development Indicators 2008
Distance Distance between capital of host country and China CEPII, http://www.cepii.fr/
Institutions Rule of law
World Bank Institute (WBI) 
Governance Indicators, from 
Quality of Government Institute
Natural resources Fuels, ores and metals exports as share of GDP
World Bank World Development 
Indicators 2008  
 
 
The main institutional variable in our analysis is the Rule of Law index from the World Bank 
Institute (WBI) Governance Indicators (cf. Kaufmann et al. 2008). The WBI indicators have the 
advantage that they have greater coverage of countries than other indices like those from the PRS 
group used in previous studies. The Rule of Law index measures “the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence”. The index runs from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher numbers signifying better institutions. This 
index broadly reflects the preceding theoretical arguments on the role of institutions in attracting 
Chinese FDI, and this index has also been used as a proxy for private sector institutions in other 
studies. Rule of law institutions have proved particularly important to avoiding rent-seeking 
problems in resource rich countries (Mehlum et al, 2006; Kolstad, 2009), so if Chinese investment 
is found to be attracted to resource rich countries with weak rule of law institutions, this may be 
particularly problematic. To check for robustness and the importance of other similar institutional 
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dimensions, we also rerun our estimations with other WBI Governance Indicators, and 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). 
 
Since some theoretical arguments point to private sector institutions, and others to democracy as 
determinants of Chinese FDI, we also use indices of democracy to test the relative importance of 
these arguments. The main proxy for democracy used for this purpose is the Polity IV democracy 
index. However, we also perform similar tests using indices from Freedom House and the WBI 
voice and accountability index. 
 
As our proxy for natural resources, we use the share of fuels plus ores and metals exports in GDP. 
By using exports shares of a set of primary products, we thus follow the seminal study of Sachs and 
Warner (1995) on the impact of resources on growth, and a number of subsequent studies of the 
economic consequences of natural resources. As noted, the previous studies of Chinese FDI have 
used different indices of natural resources and got different results. We test for the importance of 
various resources by also disaggregating our natural resource index into fuels and ores/metals 
exports, respectively. Some recent work has suggested that instead of export shares, studies of 
natural resources should use indices of resource endowments, i.e. how much is in the ground 
(Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008; Lederman and Maloney, 2008). However, consistent with the 
arguments of Kolstad and Wiig (2008), what would be attractive to investors are natural resource 
rents rather than what is in the ground, which makes export shares a better proxy than resource 
endowments. 
 
As reflected by the above specification, we interact the institutional and natural resource variable 
for our main estimation. A concern that naturally arises in included interacted variables, is that they 
will be highly correlated with the individual variables from which they arise, and hence cause 
multicollinearity problems. This turns out not to be a problem for our main estimations, however. 
The interaction term is not too highly correlated with the two individual variables from which it is 
computed (see correlation matrix in table 4). 
 
 
Table 4. Correlation matrix for main specification (N=104) 
Chinese 
outward FDI GDP Trade Inflation Distance Institutions
Natural 
resources
Institutions * 
Nat. 
Resources
Chinese outward FDI 1.00
GDP 0.41 1.00
Trade -0.05 -0.20 1.00
Inflation -0.01 -0.09 -0.13 1.00
Distance -0.23 -0.04 -0.27 0.16 1.00
Institutions 0.07 0.32 0.28 -0.30 -0.12 1.00
Natural resources 0.10 -0.13 0.15 -0.03 -0.20 -0.13 1.00
Institutions * Nat. Resources -0.14 0.04 0.22 -0.21 -0.10 0.58 0.02 1.00  
 
 
We add a number of control variables that have been found to be of importance in previous studies 
of host country determinants of global FDI flows (see Chakrabarti (2001) or Blonigen (2005) for 
reviews). The main control variables are GDP, trade, inflation, and distance between the host 
economy and China. GDP is found to be robustly associated with FDI in a number of studies, and is 
commonly argued to reflect market size in host economies and hence market-seeking motives of 
investors. Trade, measured as the sum of imports and exports as a percentage of GDP, is similarly 
found to be a robust determinant of FDI across a number of studies. Inflation is commonly used as a 
measure of macroeconomic stability in host countries, though results on this variable are more 
mixed. Since the costs of investing in more distant location is greater, we also include the 
geographical distance from the capital of the host country to Beijing, as an explanatory variable, in 
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line with gravity models of FDI. The expectation is for the coefficients of GDP and trade to be 
positive and for inflation and distance to be negative. We also test the robustness of our main results 
by adding a number of additional control variables, such as exchange rates, interest rates, total FDI, 
economic growth, GDP per capita, educational levels and infrastructure, all from the World Bank 
World Development Indicators. We also add region dummies. A number of the above variables 
were used in previous studies of Chinese FDI. In addition, we include a number of variables found 
significant in these studies, which includes cultural proximity to China (proxied by the proportion of 
ethnic Chinese in the population), a dummy for common border with China, and a dummy for 
landlocked countries. None of these variables turned out to be significant, and so are not included in 
the main specification. 
 
Since there is data for our dependent variable only for four years, there is too little variation over 
time in the variables included in the analysis to reasonably employ panel estimation techniques. We 
therefore perform OLS estimations using the average of Chinese outward FDI to the host countries 
for the period 2003-2006 as our dependent variable. This is also consistent with other studies of FDI 
flows, which smooth FDI flows by using period averages. To address endogeneity or reverse 
causality problems, we lag the explanatory variables, using their average for the period 2000-2002. 
The next section presents the results of our estimations. 
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5. Results 
Table 5 presents the main results from our econometric analysis, where the annual average of 
Chinese outward FDI flows for the period 2003-2006 are regressed on annual averages of the 
explanatory variables. The first two columns of the table show estimation results for the full sample 
of 104 countries for which data is available, while in the last two columns the sample is split into 
OECD and non-OECD countries. 
 
 
Table 5. OLS regression results, dependent variable Chinese outward FDI 2003-2006 
 
GDP 1.24e-11*** (2.50e-12)
1.15e-11*** 
(2.68e-12)
1.08e-11*   
(5.63e-12)
6.96e-11    
(4.87e-11)
Trade -0.007    (0.069)
-0.010    
(0.073)
-0.237    
(0.308)
0.068    
(0.048)
Inflation
0.102    
(0.166)
0.087    
(0.144)
0.832    
(0.824)
0.105    
(0.157)
Distance
-0.002    
(0.001)
-0.002    
(0.001)
-0.008    
(0.009)
-0.001*   
(0.001)
Institutions
-2.046    
(3.364)
2.106    
(3.560)
42.263    
(34.331)
-1.898    
(3.364)
Natural Resources
25.841    
(20.682)
29.906    
(18.911)
3655.282    
(2584.299)
33.085**  
(14.760)
Institutions* Nat. 
Resources
-46.473**  
(21.263)
-1960.285    
(1386.431)
-42.514**  
(20.382)
Constant 21.923    (15.976)
21.625    
(15.944)
13.258    
(71.861)
4.339    
(7.724)
Obs 104 104 25 79
R-sq 0.236 0.263 0.388 0.261
Regression 1 Regression 2 OECD Non-OECD
 
White standard errors in parentheses, *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at 5%, * at 10%. 
 
In the first regression, the interaction effect between institutions and natural resources is not 
included. The results show that the only variable to be significantly associated with Chinese 
outward FDI is host country GDP. In other words, Chinese outward FDI is attracted to countries 
with large markets. None of the other explanatory variables are significant. In particular, this 
estimation finds no effect of host country natural resources or institutional level on the inflow of 
Chinese FDI. 
 
The second regression shows, however, that excluding the interaction between resources and 
institutions, is too restrictive an empirical model. When adding the interaction between institutions 
and natural resources, we get a significant and negative coefficient for this term, while results 
otherwise are qualitatively unchanged. In other words, rejecting the influence of institutions and 
natural resources on Chinese investments based on the first regression would be premature. In fact, 
what the significance of the interaction effect tells us is that the effect of natural resources on 
Chinese outward FDI depends on the institutions of the host country. Recall that the institutional 
index runs from -2.5 to 2.5. For countries with bad institutions (index negative) natural resources 
attract Chinese investment. For countries with good institutions (index positive) Chinese investment 
is discouraged by natural resources. And the worse institutions in the host country, the more is 
Chinese investment attracted by natural resources. Conversely, the effect of institutions also 
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depends on the natural resources. The more natural resources, the more is Chinese FDI attracted by 
poor institutions. In sum, Chinese outward FDI is attracted to countries which combine large natural 
resources and poor institutions. 
 
We also tested whether replacing the rule of law index with other institutional indices with natural 
resources lead to similar results. Interestingly, results are qualitatively similar for most indices 
reflecting private sector institutions in some sense, i.e. the WBI governance indices which measure 
control of corruption, political stability, government effectiveness, and regulatory quality (but not 
for the Transparency International CPI). However, neither institutions not their interaction with 
resources are significant when the Polity IV democracy index is used as the institutional proxy. And 
the same result obtains if we use the Freedom House average index, or the WBI voice and 
accountability index. In other words, Chinese FDI does not appear to be driven to undemocratic 
countries, resource rich or not, by ideological motivations. 
 
The results also seem to be related to a particular type of resource. Replacing the broad natural 
resource index with narrower indices of fuel exports in GDP or ores and metals exports in GDP, our 
results shows that the interacted term is significant only for fuel exports. This suggests that 
petroleum is the resource of primary interest for Chinese FDI. The coefficient of the individual fuels 
term is not significant, however, so again this variable is only significant when interacted with 
institutions. 
 
A range of robustness tests, shows this result to be a resilient one. A significant and negative 
interaction effect remains even if additional control variables are added, such as exchange rates, 
interest rates, total FDI, economic growth, GDP per capita, educational levels and infrastructure 
(mobile phones).8 Moreover, the result is robust to the inclusion of other institutional variables, such 
as all other WBI governance variables, the average of Freedom House political rights and civil 
liberties index and their freedom of press index, and the Polity IV democracy index.9 And we get 
the same result if we add region dummies, an index of cultural proximity to China, a dummy for 
common border with China, and a dummy for landlocked countries. None of these other control or 
institutional variables proved significant. 
 
The results from the full sample thus suggest two main sets of determinants of Chinese outward 
foreign direct investment; market size, and natural resources coupled with poor institutions. 
Splitting the sample into OECD- and non-OECD countries reveals that these sets of determinants 
are associated with different kinds of host countries. The third column of Table 5 presents results 
when rerunning the main estimation for OECD countries only, of which there are 25 in our sample. 
The only significant variable is GDP, which suggests that Chinese FDI into rich countries is driven 
by market size. The fourth column of the table presents results for non-OECD countries, and shows 
that GDP is not a significant determinant of Chinese FDI to these countries, but that distance from 
China deters investment in these countries, which was not a significant variable in the full sample. 
More interestingly given our focus, natural resources and institutions appear to be determinants of 
FDI to non-OECD countries mainly. In fact, both the individual natural resource term and the 
interacted term are significant for non-OECD countries. The positive coefficient of resources 
suggests that Chinese FDI is attracted to countries with natural resources. The negative interaction 
effect indicates that the degree of that attraction depends on institutions, and that the attraction of 
resources is greater the worse the institutional environment. The effect of natural resources on 
Chinese FDI is also economically significant. For a country whose institutional score is -1.5 (which 
                                                     
8 Attempts to use other proxies for infrastructure resulted in multicollinearity problems. 
9 Addition of Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index resulted in multicollinearity 
problems. 
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is about the score of Angola), the total coefficient of natural resources is approximately 97,10 which 
means that an increase of natural resource exports in GDP of 10 percentage points brings an 
additional Chinese investment of almost 10 million USD (in constant 2000 dollars). 
 
In sum, we find that Chinese outward FDI is attracted to large markets, and countries with large 
natural resources and poor institutions. The former is related to advanced markets, whereas the 
latter is the case for non-OECD countries. Our result for GDP is consistent with that of Buckley et 
al (2007), Cheung and Qian (2008) and Cheng and Ma (2008). However, we do not find an 
unconditional effect of institutions on Chinese FDI as did Buckley et al, nor are natural resource 
insignificant as in their study. Instead, our results suggest that the effect of institutions is inherently 
related to natural resources; the weaker the institutions the more is Chinese outward FDI attracted 
by natural resources. The differences in results from previous studies may reflect the use of newer 
and more comprehensive data, or that previous studies have a more restrictive empirical model 
which did not include interaction effects.11 
 
Our findings are consistent with the idea that Chinese FDI is conducted to exploit countries with 
poor institutions and large natural resources. However, as noted earlier, it is also possible that 
Chinese investment flows to countries with these characteristics, since these represent the only 
available locations for a latecomer such as China. We attempted to test whether the second 
interpretation holds, by adding the growth in resource exports as an explanatory variable. If Chinese 
investment flows to countries that have unexploited resources and hence are still growing in terms 
of natural resources, this should make the interaction term insignificant. However, the interaction 
term of institutions and resources remains significant when adding this term. This lends support to 
the former explanation that China takes advantage of countries with poor institutions and large 
natural resources. 
 
Our results do also lend support to the idea that determinants of Chinese FDI differs from that of 
other countries. Rerunning our estimations using total FDI inflows as a dependent variable,12 there 
is no significant direct effect of natural resources on FDI, nor is the interaction between natural 
resources and institutions significant. This also holds for the sub-sample of non-OECD host 
countries. In contrast to Chinese FDI, total FDI is attracted to countries with good institutions.  
6. Concluding remarks 
The results of this paper show that institutions and natural resources have an interactive effect on 
Chinese outward foreign direct investment. The worse the institutional environment of a host 
country, the more is Chinese FDI attracted by the country’s natural resources. These results add 
significantly to our understanding of Chinese FDI, since previous studies have not included these 
types of interaction effects, and therefore fail to capture an important relation between resource 
riches and institutions. Our findings are consistent with an image of China as a “ravenous dragon”, 
or an idea that Chinese FDI is conducted to exploit countries with poor institutions and large natural 
resources.  
 
An important question is what consequences this type of investment behaviour has for host 
economies, and developing economies in particular. It is striking that Chinese foreign investment 
                                                     
10 Computed as 33 + (-42.5)*(-1.5) = 96.75. 
11 Buckley et al (2007) also use ores and metals exports to proxy natural resources, which our results suggest is not the 
relevant type of natural resource to include in the analysis. 
12 Sample includes 102 of the original 104 countries for which we have FDI data, but differences in results are not due to 
differences in country samples. 
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appears to be attracted by the type of institutional dysfunctions which are at the core of the so-called 
resource curse, whereby poor institutions lead to a detrimental impact of natural resources on 
economic development (Mehlum et al, 2006). This may be particularly harmful, since Chinese 
investment would then play straight into key dysfunctions of resource rich developing countries, 
possibly exacerbating resource-related problems. This further strengthens the tentative conclusion 
of Frynas and Paolo (2007:251) that “the new investments in the African oil and gas sector may not 
necessarily be good news for ordinary Africans”. 
 
Our results, and comparisons with previous studies, also suggest that Chinese FDI outflows differ 
from FDI from other regions, in their attraction to poorly governed countries rich in natural 
resources. These differences in investment patterns likely reflects background characteristics of the 
Chinese economy, in particular predominant state-ownership of multinational companies, and the 
institutional context of China. Though aggregate FDI flows from China and from other regions 
differ, there might still be similarities at the sector level which the aggregate data mask. For 
instance, it is possible that oil investment from China and from other countries is driven by the same 
set of factors. At present, data which disaggregates FDI flows both by sector and location is not 
available for most countries, including China. But this is an important issue to pursue in further 
research. 
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SUMMARY
Chinese outward foreign direct investment (FDI) has increased substantially in 
recent years. Though this has generated considerable interest in the motivations 
and drivers of Chinese investment abroad, there have been few systematic 
empirical studies of these questions. This paper performs an econometric 
analysis of the host country determinants of Chinese outward FDI in the period 
2003-2006. The focus is in particular on institutional and natural resource-
related determinants, and their interaction. We fi nd that Chinese outward FDI is 
attracted to large markets, and to countries with a combination of large natural 
resources and poor institutions. Disaggregation shows that the former effect is 
related to OECD countries, whereas the latter interaction effect holds for non-
OECD countries.
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